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Scenario One 
Guy walks into his banker’s office, sits down and 
announces “You know, don’t you, that I haven’t a snowflake’s chance 
of repaying all the money I have borrowed from you over the years?” 
“What,” gasps the banker in horror, “you came all the 
way down here to tell me that!” 
“Not at all,” replies the customer calmly, “I came down 
here to discuss the terms of a new loan.” 
Scenario Two 
Greek guy walks into a negotiating room in Brussels . . . 
* * * * 
Financial wardship 
As of this writing, Greece has embarked on its third official sector 
bailout package in five years.  The total amount already borrowed under these 
packages, excluding the financial assistance provided to the Greek banks by the 
European Central Bank, already approaches €246 billion.  The latest program, if fully 
implemented, could add as much as another €86 billion.  Greece faces the very real 
prospect of being the financial ward of its official sector sponsors (the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund) for the whole of this decade. 
Two things have changed over the last five years.  First, Greece’s 
economy has contracted painfully as a result of the fiscal adjustment measures upon 
which continued official sector assistance has been conditioned.  The social and 
political backlash in Greece is perfectly visible.  Second, the sheer size of Greece’s 
public sector debt burden -- now in excess of 176% of GDP -- is widely recognized 
as unsustainable.  Although the maturities of these loans have quietly been extended 
for decades into the future, and the interest rate reduced substantially, even the IMF 
has recently called for further debt relief including a possible write-down of the 
nominal amount due to official sector lenders apart, naturally, from amounts due to 
the IMF itself.  Discussing massive new loans while simultaneously asking for a 
write off of the old loans extended by the same group of creditors will test the skills 
of any debt negotiator. 




Both Greece and its official sector sponsors should wish to end this 
financial wardship.  For Greece, it is a matter of pride and a sense that the country is 
regaining some control of its financial destiny.  For the official sector, pouring in 
additional money while openly discussing the forgiveness of a portion of the money-
already-poured-in poses an obvious political problem.  The question is how.  Greece 
will certainly need to borrow.  If that money does not come from official sector 
sources, it must come from the private sector.  But commercial lenders will be leery 
of extending new credit to Greece for so long as the risk of a Greek exit from the 
Eurozone is present.  Private creditors will also naturally worry about lending new 
money to a country carrying a colossal and unsustainable stock of existing debt. 
Last spring, when Grexit fears temporarily subsided, Greece was able 
to borrow in the international bond markets at an annual interest rate of less than 5%.  
The market’s logic was that by virtue of the maturity extension of the official sector 
loans coupled with very low interest rates on those credits, the official sector had 
structurally subordinated itself to any new private sector lending that matured before 
the official sector credits started to fall due.  The buyers of these new bonds had 
apparently persuaded themselves that the official sector either could not, or would 
not, accelerate its loans and thus become an unexpected competitor for scarce Greek 
financial resources in the interim1.  The trick in the future will be to make a country 
with a debt to GDP ratio in excess of 176% presentable to the markets without 
inflicting an immediate, and politically unpalatable, nominal haircut on that debt 
stock. 
Legal Subordination (“Turn Over”) 
Assuming that Grexit worries eventually recede, the official sector 
lenders to Greece (apart from the IMF, which presumably will wish to stay out of 
this) could consider formally subordinating their existing claims against Greece, on a 
                                                
1  It strikes us as doubtful whether the private markets would again be prepared to accept only a de 
facto, structural subordination of official sector debt before resuming lending to Greece.  Following 
Greece’s failure to make a payment to the IMF on June 30, 2015, the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) released a “Declaration of Default and Reservation of Rights” (July 3, 2015).  This 
Declaration noted that an Event of Default had occurred under the EFSF Public Sector Involvement -- 
Liquidity Management Facility Agreement dated 1 March 2012 and stated: 
 
The occurrence of an Event of Default under the PSI Facility Agreement 
entitles the EFSF, by written notice to the Hellenic Republic, to cancel the 
Facility and/or declare the aggregate principal amount of all Financial 
Assistance Amounts made and outstanding thereunder to be immediately due 
and payable, together with accrued interest.  (emphasis added) 
 
 The EFSF stopped short of accelerating unmatured principal under this Facility, but expressly 
reserved the right to do so.  In light of this reminder of EFSF’s acceleration rights, we suspect private 
sector lenders will now look for a legal -- not just a structural -- subordination as a condition to new 
lending. 
 




targeted basis, to encourage new private sector lending to the country.  Ideally, such 
lending could displace some of the official sector borrowing contemplated by the 
third bailout program.  Perhaps more realistically, however, it could be used to 
augment the resources available under that program without having to negotiate a 
fourth bailout or to fund pro-growth initiatives not contemplated by the third 
program. 
Any such subordination would be targeted, meaning that the official 
sector would need to approve both the terms and the general use of proceeds of any 
new senior borrowing.  This would not be a general subordination in favor of all 
future private sector lending. 
Subordination arrangements come in many forms but this one can be 
straightforward.  The subordination would require that if ever the new (senior) 
private sector bonds fell into payment arrears, the official sector creditors would turn 
over to the trustee acting for the bondholders such portion of the payments received 
under official sector debt as may be necessary to cure the payment default on the 
senior bonds.  The subordination is not a guarantee: if at the time the official sector 
loans are also in default, the official sector would be under no obligation to 
indemnify the senior bondholders.  The instrument of subordination would need to be 
governed by the law of a non-EU country to avoid the risk of a subsequent EU 
directive that undercuts the efficacy of the subordination.  The debtor would be asked 
to agree that any funds paid over to the senior creditors in this way would still be 
owing to the official sector lenders. 
Enhanced Structural Subordination 
The alternative to a full legal subordination with a turn-over feature of 
the kind described above would be enhanced structural subordination.  Under this 
approach the official sector would open a window (by deferring the maturity of its 
own loans) into which new private sector lenders could advance credit without fear 
of competing with official sector lenders when the time comes for repayment.  To do 
this effectively, however, the official sector would need voluntarily to forswear its 
ability to accelerate the maturity of those loans, whatever the provocation.  The 
structured subordination could be further enhanced by a full debt service holiday on 
official sector loans for a number of years or by setting the interest rate on those 
loans very low during the window period.  Although the new private sector lenders 
would not have the comfort of knowing that any payments made to the official sector 
lenders would have to be turned over to them in the event of a default, they could 
take considerable comfort from the fact that little, if anything, would be due to the 
official sector creditors during this period. 
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The positions of the actors 
The official sector lenders.  Official sector lenders can be expected 
initially to recoil at the word “subordination”.  After all, these are the same countries 
that claimed for themselves a preferred creditor status in the 2012 Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, second only to the preferred creditor 
status of the IMF.  They will see a voluntary subordination in favor of private sector 
lenders as a long step down from that exalted perch.  The charm of a targeted 
subordination for the official sector -- its only charm -- lies in a sober assessment of 
the alternatives:  (i) lending the money itself with the near certainty that the funds 
will not be recovered for many decades and a good chance that a portion will never 
be recovered at all or (ii) immediately writing off a portion of existing official sector 
loans in order to make the debtor country presentable to the market2. 
The private market will impose its own discipline on sovereign 
borrowers and will punish what it perceives as imprudent policies with an immediate 
basis point penalty.  All sovereign borrowers in the public markets are subject to 
these forces.  Although they may not substitute entirely for official sector prescribed 
fiscal adjustment measures, market discipline can reinforce the debtor’s motivation 
to pursue appropriate policies and perhaps occasionally avoid the need for the 
official sector to use its heavy fist in enforcing compliance. 
The official sector could analyze the situation as follows.  There are 
four possible outcomes were the official sector to subordinate its loans on a targeted 
basis to new private sector lending: 
                                                
2  The IMF staff’s latest assessment (released on July 14, 2015) notes that: 
 
At the core of this conclusion [that the grace and repayment periods of 
European official sector debts need to be doubled] is the fundamental 
premise that public debt cannot be assumed to migrate back onto the balance 
sheet of the private sector at interest rates consistent with debt sustainability 
until debt is much lower.  Greece cannot return to markets anytime soon at 
interest rates that it can afford from a medium-term perspective.  (emphasis 
added) 
 
 If a debt writeoff is not on the (political) cards, the IMF staff concludes, a “very dramatic extension” 
of the grace and repayment periods for Greece’s official sector (European) debt would be required. 
 
This reflects the basic premise that debt cannot be assumed to migrate back 
onto the balance sheet of the private sector at interest rates close to the 
current AAA rates before debt levels have been brought to much lower 
levels; borrowing at anything but AAA rates in the near term will bring about 
an unsustainable debt dynamic for the next several decades. (emphasis 
added) 
 
 IMF Country Report 15/186, Greece:  An Update of IMF Staff’s Preliminary Public Debt 




(i) Greece pays in full both its official sector and private sector 
debts. 
(ii) Greece defaults on both its official sector and private sector 
debts. 
(iii) Greece pays its official sector lenders but defaults on the new 
(senior) private sector loans. 
(iv) Greece pays its private sector lenders but defaults on its official 
sector debt. 
In both scenarios (i) and (ii) the official sector is a big winner.  It will 
have encouraged new private sector loans -- and thereby displaced the need for 
additional official sector exposure -- at no cost to itself.  This is especially true in 
scenario (ii) where the defaults occur across the board and would have fallen on the 
official sector had it lent the additional money itself. 
In scenario (iii) the official sector (assuming a full legal 
subordination) would be obliged to turn over a portion of the funds they receive to 
cover a default on the senior private sector debt.  But that will simply result in those 
turned-over amounts still being due to the official sector and the whole premise of 
this scenario is that Greece has decided to continue paying its official sector debt in 
full. 
Scenario (iv) would not require the official sector to turn over any 
funds to the private sector.  The official sector lenders are only prejudiced in this 
scenario if the size of the new senior private sector debts has grown so large that they 
consume resources that would otherwise have been used to pay official sector debts.  
Of course, that same strain on resources would presumably also have been present 
had the new loans come from the official sector in the first place. 
The private sector lenders.  A prospective private sector lender 
benefiting from the subordination should view Greece as effectively shriven of the 
vast majority of its outstanding debt.  The official sector debt will still be there, of 
course, but the terms of the subordination should ensure that the official sector 
lenders will not be competitors for scarce resources if ever Greece finds itself unable 
to pay both its senior private debt and its official sector creditors.  Outstanding Greek 
Government bonds now total about €37.7 billion; IMF credits add about €21.4 billion 
(for a total of €59.1 billion).  No subordination would be sought from these lenders.  
If the other official sector debt is expunged from the Greek balance sheet for credit 
analysis purposes, this would be equivalent to lending to a Eurozone member with a 
debt to GDP of less than 35%.   
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Greece.  Reaccessing the private capital markets, even under cover of 
a targeted subordination of existing claims, would begin to wean Greece from its 
status as a ward of the official sector.  It would convey a measure of independence, 
perhaps a measure of dignity, in the public eye. 
It would not, however, be costless.  The markets will lend to Greece at 
higher interest rates and shorter tenors than Greece’s official sector loans.  Moreover, 
the private lenders will expect to be repaid at maturity and will not hesitate to pursue 
their legal remedies if they are not.  On balance, all of this may be salutary.  The 
principal brake on excessive sovereign borrowing is the realization that the money 
must eventually be repaid.  As noted above, the markets exact their own discipline on 
sovereign debtors -- all sovereign debtors -- and it is altogether healthy that they do 
so. 
Conclusion 
Encouraging private sector lending to Greece through a targeted 
subordination of official sector debt achieves certain objectives but not others.  It will 
not obviate the need for additional official sector financial assistance; even in the 
best case, private lending could displace only a small portion of the needed official 
sector loans.  It will not avoid the need for additional fiscal adjustment in Greece; the 
markets would demand it even if the official sector did not.  And it will not eliminate 
the eventual need for official sector debt relief although it may help to deflect radical 
forms of debt relief like nominal haircuts until a more politically auspicious moment.  
Finally, no amount of subordination will induce new private sector lending at 
tolerable interest rates until the risk of a Greek exit from the Eurozone subsides. 
Between May 2010 and March 2012 (when Greece executed a 
restructuring of what remained of its bond indebtedness), the official sector allowed 
Greece’s private sector creditors to exit a distressed situation entirely unscathed.  
Those liabilities migrated, at par, from the hands of the people who lent the money 
into the hands of taxpayer-funded official sector creditors.  It was a policy now 
almost universally regretted.  Encouraging private capital flows back into Greece 
should be a priority of the official sector.   
* * * * 
 
 
